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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
In this age of globalization, international trade and multiple transactions continue to increase, so 
the role of tax treaties appears more significant today than ever before.1 But, when talking about 
taxation, one may assume that there is very little international in the assessment and collection of 
taxes because each country levies taxes for its sovereign purposes and in any case aims to protect 
its tax base. Double tax treaties serve a purpose of eliminating double taxation by providing 
certainty with regard to different types of income. Naturally, taxpayers rely on such bilateral 
agreements to determine the tax outcome of their cross-border activities.2  
In recent times, the problem of tax avoidance has become especially sharp due to sophisticated 
tax planning schemes. Often, taxpayers choose to create some artificial arrangements and sham 
transactions in order to receive additional tax benefits or to fall under preferential tax regimes. 
So, due to intersection of foreign and domestic tax systems and the fast growing bilateral tax 
treaty network the opportunities for tax avoidance dramatically increased. At the same time, 
countries are strictly constrained in their ability to gather information in foreign jurisdictions to 
reveal international tax avoidance schemes.3 Hopefully, not so long time ago tax treaties have 
launched a positive tendency in improving this information flow (including tax information 
exchange agreements)4. In an attempt to combat tax avoidance, most countries have developed 
special anti-abuse rules that can exist in a form of a general anti-avoidance rule, or specific 
legislative anti-avoidance provisions; or even in the form of developed judicial anti-avoidance 
doctrines elaborated by courts.5 The problem investigated by this paper is how domestic anti-
avoidance rules affect double taxation conventions. The below investigation is complicated by 
the fact that anti-avoidance legislation has been developed differently in each state. Therefore, 
there are apparent differences between countires in the level of tolerance, which the revenue 
                                               
1 N. Goyette, Tax Treaty Abuse: A Second Look, Canadian Tax Journal, 2003, Vol.51 #2, p. 764. 
2 C. Elliffe, International Tax Avoidance – the tension between protecting the tax base and certainty of law, Journal 
of Business Law, 2011, 7, p. 647. 
3 B.J. Arnold, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model, 
Bulletin – Tax Treaty Monitor, June 2004, p. 244. 
4 C. Elliffe, International Tax Avoidance – the tension between protecting the tax base and certainty of law, Journal 
of Business Law, 2011, 7, p. 647. 
5 B.J. Arnold, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model, 
Bulletin – Tax Treaty Monitor, June 2004, p. 244. 
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authorities and the courts exhibit while dealing with abusive transactions, especially those taking 
place on the international arena.6 
Although concluded within the scope of international public law, double tax treaties have effect 
within national legal systems. Thus, after being signed and ratified, double tax conventions must 
be properly implemented within a national legal order. This process also varies depending on 
whether a jurisdiction is monistic or dualistic. Anyway, the treaty’s life within the national legal 
system is quite distinct from that one within the framework of international public law. Various 
problems arise in connection with the domestic implementation of a treaty. Arguably, such 
problems can be entirely resolved by the adoption of anti-abuse rules or the elaboration of anti-
abuse principles by the courts. The crucial question is whether such rules or principles are 
compatible with the double tax treaties?7 
In most countries, tax treaties prevail over domestic tax laws in the event of a conflict. Taxpayers 
often rely on the provisions of a tax treaty according to the principles of legal certainty and 
legitimate expectations. The relationship between domestic anti-abuse legislation and double tax 
treaties, in particular the extent to which anti-avoidance legislation applies to deny tax treaty 
benefits, is of crucial value not only for the purpose of this thesis but also for the practical 
implementation of double tax conventions.8  
1.2. Problem description 
The question raised in this thesis – whether the domestic anti-abuse legislation applies to deny 
the tax treaty benefits – cannot be decided unambiguously. As controversial debate shows, it is 
rather difficult to elaborate the uniform international approach concerning this issue due to a 
number of arguments: the incorporation of double tax treaties into domestic law takes place 
differently in various countries; some countries do not have GAAR at all, while others have well 
developed doctrines or an express statutory provision, or even the combination of both; also, 
some states explicitly define the relationship between the tax treaties and the GAAR, whilst 
others do not. Therefore, it is quite logical that the problem in this thesis should be considered 
from two opposite angles: in general with regard to OECD guidance and specifically from the 
particular state perspective9. 
                                               
6 IFA Congress Seminar Series, How domestic anti-avoidance rules affect double taxation conventions, Cahiers de 
Droit Fiscal International, 1994, Vol. 19.c, p. 4. 
7 IFA Congress Seminar Series, How domestic anti-avoidance rules affect double taxation conventions, Cahiers de 
Droit Fiscal International, 1994, Vol.19.c, p.6. 
8 B.J. Arnold, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model, 
Bulletin – Tax Treaty Monitor, June 2004, p. 244. 
9 C. Elliffe, International Tax Avoidance – the tension between protecting the tax base and certainty of law, Journal 
of Business Law, 2011, 7, p. 648. 
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1.3. Purpose 
Through comparing and analyzing of the OECD approach to the problem in issue and particular 
country perspective, the author clearly realizes that it would be very difficult to come to the 
certain outcome of the assigned task. At the same time some common principles can be 
indentified in interaction between domestic GAARs and double tax conventions. It is also the 
purpose of the present work to determine whether OECD approach (the factual and interpretative 
one) fits adequately the real domestic situations in question. The paper seeks to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of the three general categories of approaches that states have and 
suggest the most appropriate one. Our assessment is based on two fundamental. The first is the 
certainty of the law and pacta sunt servanda. The second is the purely domestic interests of each 
individual state purporting to protect its tax base. If certainty in tax outcome is to be preferred by 
a country, then the treaty should override the GAAR; if the prevention of tax abuse is the 
objective, then the GAAR should override the treaty. The third approach considered by this 
paper seems to be more compromise, permitting the GAAR to take precedence over the treaty, 
unless there is a conflict in which the treaty prevails. 
1.4. Method and materials 
The present research is based on the traditional legal approach. The thesis will analyze different 
sources of law and materials, such as international agreements, documents of international 
organizations, case law and scholars’ articles in order to assess whether domestic anti-abuse 
legislation applies to deny tax treaty benefits. The elements of comparative studies and 
comparative methods will also play a significant role in achieving the goal of this thesis. The 
problem was analyzed from the OECD perspective and then compared as against domestic 
perspective of the chosen country. The author suggests that it could be more helpful for analysis 
to group the counties approaches into three general categories by means of precedence of the 
domestic GAARs and the tax treaties as against each other (Report to IFA 2010). The choice of 
case law is based on research of the IBFD tax treaty case law database and on the accessibility of 
cases in the domestic sources of law as well as on the relevance of the precedents to the topic 
discussed in this paper.  
1.5. Delimitations 
The problem this paper strives to resolve is very broad and complicated. The vast debate around 
the relationship between the domestic anti-abuse legislation and double tax treaties takes place 
for a long time among scholars and practitioners. The author is aware of various arguable issues 
that may arise while investigating the main question of this thesis, such as whether anti-abuse 
legislation has an international effect, or whether the universal anti-abuse rules should be 
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elaborated or not, and what is the relationship between the domestic anti-avoidance rules and 
those that are included in the treaties itself. But for the interests of this thesis the aforementioned 
questions are omitted. The focus of the present work is to investigate the relationship between 
domestic anti-abuse legislation and double tax treaties through the position of international 
public law, namely the OECD approach compared to the one from the states national perspective 
based on domestic legal order. Anti-avoidance rules included in the treaties do not fall within the 
scope of the present work either. 
The particular Russian cases chosen for analysis mostly refer to the Russian thin cap rules. The 
choice of these cases explicitly reflects the trend chosen by Russian courts in a narrow area 
because Russia does not have well developed anti-abuse legislation. Since the Russian language 
is a native one for the author, the source of the references in the paper to the legal system of 
Russia has been taken from the original sources and therefore is presented in a non-official 
translation (done by the author) both against the original national laws and the precedent. The 
narration and comments about the facts of the cases and the approach taken by the national 
courts regarding each case is funneled towards the problem raised by this thesis because the legal 
issues considered by the courts have very broad nature and are very complicated due to the 
number of episodes within some cases. 
1.6. Outline 
In order to answer the main question posed in the Introduction and to receive a deeper and 
comprehensive understanding of the problem the thesis is structured in the following way: 
chapter 2 gets the reader acquainted with the OECD position towards the problem both before 
and after Revisions to the Commentary; chapter 3 corresponds about anti-abuse rules itself, both 
general and specific; then, in chapter 4 the thesis provides with an overview of methods of 
interpretation presented in the  VCLT and the role of the OECD Commentary in tax treaty 
interpretation; chapter 5, that is the core part of the present work, touches upon the approaches 
that can be envisaged with regard to relationship between the domestic anti-abuse rules and tax 
treaties in case of conflict; chapter 6 examines case law and provides with analysis of the 
problem from the national perspective; and chapter 7 holds the overall analysis and conclusive 
remarks. The diagram over company structures regarding last considered case is presented in 
Appendix. 
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2. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW, APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM 
Interestingly, while examining effective tax treaties one can find little about tax avoidance itself. 
More often, it states about prevention of fiscal evasion as used to be arguably indicated in the 
titles of double conventions. 
2.1. Is combating tax avoidance one of the purposes of tax treaties? 
The OECD’s report on Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue of 1998 comprises 
definitions and most common features of tax heavens and preferential tax regimes, as well as its 
recommendations concerning both domestic legislation and practices, and tax treaties regarding 
counteracting harmful tax competition. As far as tax avoidance and tax treaties are concerned, 
one of the recommendations called upon the clarification of the status of domestic anti-abuse 
rules and doctrines in tax treaties. It aimed at the compatibility of domestic anti-abuse rules with 
the OECD Model, pursuing to take away any uncertainty or ambiguity.10 It proves to be not the 
only recommendation provided for in this Report that subsequently was embodied in the 2003 
Revised Commentaries. 
Even though various tax conventions contain the statement on elimination of double taxation and 
on the prevention of fiscal evasion, such title references were removed due to acknowledgment 
of other purposes towards the tax conventions are addressed.11 As R. Russo argues in his book, 
there is a delicate difference between the notions of tax planning, tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
While tax planning and tax evasion are certainly legal or legitimate as well as criminal and 
directly violating appropriately, the tax avoidance is quite smooth term balancing between tax 
planning and tax evasion, and depending on many facts and circumstances tends to be justified 
as ‘acceptable tax avoidance’, namely tax planning, or otherwise is used to somehow mitigate 
tax evasion.12 For many scholars it is rather controversial question whether tax evasion 
comprises tax avoidance or not. Most of countries’ legislations distinguish these two terms 
inferring tax avoidance as not criminal, whilst the evasion is a subject to criminal conviction up 
to imprisonment. 
As of 28th of January 2003 the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model proclaims that the one 
of fundamental purposes of the OECD Model is preventing tax avoidance and evasion.13 
Obviously, before that amendment to the Commentary on Art.1 it stated that tax treaties should 
not promote tax avoidance, therefore it can not be construed that tax avoidance prevention was 
particular purpose of OECD Model previously. Actually, some scholars interpreted the pre-2003 
                                               
10 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: an Emerging Global Issue, 1998, Ch.3, III, pp. 48-49. 
11 Para.16 of the Introduction to the OECD Model. 
12 R.Russo, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning, 2007, p. 49-51. 
13 Para. 7 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model. 
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Commentary to mean that tax treaties could endure tax avoidance only until the treaty is 
supplemented with concrete anti-avoidance provisions. Thus, those countries that are 
preoccupied by tax avoidance issues to be adopted with domestic anti-avoidance rules should 
preserve directly its application in conventions.14 
Thereby, alongside with the principal purpose of tax conventions to facilitate international trade 
and movement of capital and persons by eliminating international double taxation, the additional 
supplementary but equally important purpose is prevention of tax avoidance and evasion.15 Such 
proclaimed purpose to prevent tax avoidance directly refers to both the conventions’ 
interpretation and application. Relying on Art.31(1) of the VCLT “A treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.16 Thereby, the articles of tax conventions 
should be interpreted to prevent tax avoidance. The only one country that put forward its 
observation against the newly proclaimed purpose of tax conventions such as combating tax 
avoidance was Switzerland.17 Therefore, there are no expectations that the Swiss revenue 
authorities will apply Switserland’s tax conventions to counter tax avoidance. 
It can be erroneously believed that based on the principle of reciprocity other countries 
(Switzerland partners under bilateral treaties) are prevented from the application of such 
conventions to counter tax avoidance either. However, in practice the treaties’ application is 
rarely reciprocal. Apparently, not only attractive but also correct view is that such counties are 
instead entitled to apply these tax conventions to prevent tax avoidance unless the treaty does not 
enclose a clear rule providing to the contrary. Naturally, the Switzerland has to accept the 
majority position that Switzerland’s treaty partners do apply their conventions with Switzerland 
to prevent tax avoidance.18  
2.2. Pre-2003 OECD position 
Between 11th of April 1977 and 28th of January 2003, the OECD Model held an opinion that the 
core purpose of bilateral tax treaties was to promote the movement of capital and persons as well 
as exchanges of goods and services by eliminating double taxation, indicating that tax 
conventions “should not, however, help tax avoidance or evasion”19. Moreover, taxpayers could 
                                               
14 B.J. Arnold, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model, 
Bulletin – Tax Treaty Monitor, June 2004, p. 248. 
15 Para. 7 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model. 
16 Art. 31 (1) of the VCLT. 
17 Para. 27.9 of the Commentary to Art.1 of the OECD Model. 
18 B.J. Arnold, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model, 
Bulletin – Tax Treaty Monitor, June 2004, p. 246. 
19 Para.7 of Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Full Version). 
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exploit differences in countries’ tax levels, but “[i]t is for the States concerned to adopt 
provisions in their domestic law to counter such maneuvers. Such states will then wish in their 
bilateral double taxation conventions, to preserve the application of provisions of this kind 
contained in their domestic laws”20. 
Arguably, it can be inferred from aforementioned OECD statements that, as a general rule, the 
application of domestic anti-avoidance rules was impossible in order to deny tax treaty benefits 
as long as the contrary directly mentioned in the tax convention. 
In Para.23, as it read between 23rd of July 1992 and 21st of September 1995, the Commentary 
tried to reconcile the discordant opinions concerning the status of CFC rules within domestic 
anti-avoidance concept. The position of the majority of the OECD Member States on the matter 
was that they “[a]re part of the basic domestic rules set by national tax law for determining 
which facts give rise to a tax liability. These rules are not addressed in tax treaties and are 
therefore not affected by them”21. Fairly, the Commentary also recognized a dissenting 
viewpoint.  
Thus, according to the majority view, if domestic anti-avoidance rules were given precedence 
over treaties, economic double taxation might arise, “[t]he same income being taxed in the 
hands of two different taxpayers”22. The opposite standpoint holds that “[s]uch rules are subject 
to the general provisions of tax treaties against double taxation, especially where the treaty itself 
contains provisions aimed at counteracting its improper use”23. 
Under Para.24 of the Commentary on Art. 1, “[i]t is the view of the wide majority that such 
rules, and the underlying principles, do not have to be confirmed in the text of the convention to 
be applicable”24. Furthermore, pursuant to Para.26, “[t]he majority of Member countries accept 
counteracting measures as a necessary means of maintaining equity and neutrality of national 
tax laws in an international environment characterized by very different tax burdens”25.  
2.3. 2003 Revisions to the Commentary 
Two main questions posed in the Para.9.1 on Art.1 of the Commentary are as follows: 
 - whether tax treaties can be interpreted and applied to deny treaty benefits with respect to 
abusive transactions; and 
                                               
20 Para.7 of Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Full Version). 
21 Para.23 of Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Full Version). 
22 Para.23 of Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Full Version). 
23 Para.23 of Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Full Version). 
24 Para.24 of Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Full Version). 
25 Para.26 of Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Full Version). 
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 - whether domestic anti-avoidance rules conflict with, and their application is precluded by, tax 
treaties.26 
For the majority of countries the first approach was elaborated by the OECD Commentaries. 
Namely, the fact that taxes are eventually imposed through the provisions of domestic law by 
means of provisions of tax conventions leads to a presumption that any abuse of the provisions 
of a tax treaty can equally be considered as an abuse of the provisions of domestic law under 
which tax is imposed. In such a situation, the issue then funnels to whether the provisions of tax 
treaties may prevent the application of anti-abuse provisions of domestic law. As stipulated in 
Para. 22.1 of the Commentary, being part of the basic domestic rules established by domestic tax 
laws for determining which facts cause tax liability, such anti-avoidance rules are not affected by 
tax treaties. To conclude, usually there is no conflict between domestic anti-abuse rules and the 
provisions of tax treaties.27 
But, for other countries, though, abuses of a treaty are not automatically abuses of domestic law. 
They consider some abuses as being abuses of the tax treaty itself, separately from abuses of 
domestic tax provisions. “These States, however, then consider that a proper construction of tax 
conventions allows them to disregard abusive transactions, such as those entered into with the 
view to obtaining unintended benefits under the provisions of these conventions”.28 
Despite having two various approaches with regard to anti-abuse provisions, the OECD holds the 
sole consistent position respecting transactions that comprise an abuse of the convention, 
namely, treaty benefits should not be granted then.29 It is worth indicating, that it should not be 
only ‘lightly assumed’ that a type of transaction undertaken is abusive. It continues with ‘a 
guiding principle’ that restricts access to treaty benefits in case if the most crucial purpose for 
undertaking a transaction is to receive tax advantage or privilege tax treatment, which in these 
circumstances would contradict with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions.30 
2.4. Summary 
In a nutshell, the pre-2003 Commentary on Art.1 dealing with the improper use of double tax 
treaties was not clear enough. On the one hand it considers domestic anti-abuse rules consistent 
with tax conventions provisions as against treaty abuse, but on the other hand pursuant to Para.10 
on Art.1 “[i]t may be appropriate for Contracting States to agree in bilateral negotiations that 
any relief from tax should not apply in certain cases, or to agree that the application of the 
                                               
26 Paras. 9.1 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Condensed Version), 2010. 
27 Paras.9.1, 9.2 and 22.1 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Condensed Vertion), 2010. 
28 Para.9.3 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Condensed Vertion), 2010. 
29 Para.9.4 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Condensed Vertion), 2010. 
30 Para.9.5 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Condensed Vertion), 2010. 
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provisions of domestic laws against tax avoidance should not be affected by the Convention”31. 
The author however considers 2003 Revisions as a clarification rather than a modification of the 
OECD position. Arguably, the OECD viewpoint can be changed without amendments to the 
OECD Model itself but to the Commentaries only. 
The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary on Art.1 are helpful but they do not provide enough 
certainty with respect to several aspects. Even though Revisions clarify that one of the tax treaty 
purposes is to prevent tax avoidance and shed fresh light on the relationship between tax treaties 
and domestic anti-avoidance rules32, the clear method for the interpretation of the provisions of 
tax treaties to prevent abusive tax avoidance is not clarified so far. Para.22.2 leaves more room 
for maneuver rather than provides a straightforward reply “Whilst these rules do not conflict with 
tax conventions, there is agreement that member countries should carefully observe the specific 
obligations enshrined in tax treaties to relieve double taxation as long as there is no clear 
evidence that the treaties are being abused33.  
2.5. Observations to the Commentary  
Several states put forward observations to the amended OECD Commentary to record their 
disagreement with the above statements. These are Chile, the Netherlands, France, Portugal, 
Belgium, Ireland and Mexico. Some of them, like Belgium, consider that “the application of 
CFC is contrary to the provisions of paragraph 7 of Article 5, paragraph 1 of Article 7 and 
paragraph 5 of Article 10 of the Convention. That Contracting State thus disregards the legal 
personality of the foreign entity and therefore acts contrary to the Convention”34. Ireland holds 
to more gentle opinion and argues that it is not always easy to come to consolidated view on the 
matter or that not each conflict should be decided in favour of domestic provisions35. 
“Luxembourg does not share the interpretation in paragraphs 9.2, 22.1 and 23 which provide 
that there is generally no conflict between anti-abuse provisions of the domestic law of a 
Contracting State and the provisions of its tax conventions. Absent an express provision in the 
Convention, Luxembourg therefore believes that a State can only apply its domestic anti-abuse 
provisions in specific cases after recourse to the mutual agreement procedure”36. The 
Netherlands clearly indicated that “[d]oes not adhere to the statements in the Commentaries that 
as a general rule domestic anti-avoidance rules and control foreign companies provisions do not 
                                               
31 Para.10 of Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Full Version). 
32 B.J. Arnold, Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model, 
Bulletin – Tax Treaty Monitor, June 2004, p. 248. 
33 Para.22.2 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Condensed Vertion), 2010. 
34 Para.27.4 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Condensed Version), 2010. 
35 Para.27.5 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Condensed Version), 2010. 
36 Para.27.6 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Condensed Version), 2010. 
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conflict with the provisions of tax conventions.”37 So, the matter of interpretation by domestic 
courts of the revised commentaries should be decided for each jurisdiction separately. 
3. ANTI-ABUSE LEGISLATION 
3.1. Domestic anti-avoidance provisions (general) 
R. Russo provides for the definition of GAAR as follows: these are domestic rules that permit 
the revenue authorities to recharacterize a transaction or several transactions that were 
undertaken with the only one or the main purpose of obtaining illegal tax advantages. Some 
countries incorporated such rules into tax codes, others   simply follow the general principle of 
abuse of law, developed from their judicial doctrine.38 For instance, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, South Africa, Ireland, Singapore and Malaysia include a statutory general anti-
avoidance rule (GAAR). Continental European countries such as Spain, Germany, France and 
the Netherlands, have a similar rule or doctrine – abus de droit, fraus legis or acte anormale de 
gestion. A range of judicially developed doctrines comes from the United States and the United 
Kingdom that pass by the names such as the business purpose doctrine, step transactions 
doctrine, economic substance doctrine and substance over form doctrine39. Such countries like 
Ukraine and Russia have no well developed anti-abuse legislation and instead have special anti-
abuse provisions. Some countries like the USA and Canada have combination of different types 
of anti-avoidance rules. 
Maybe, the simplest of these doctrines and probably the only universal one is sham. In this 
approach the true nature of legal transactions is determined. The contracting parties can pretend 
that they have entered into transaction or disguise the real transaction in the form of another one 
contained in the written contract. Usually, even in the most rigorous states the tax law will be 
applied in respect of the true legal relationship while the sham transaction will be void. 
Substance-over-form doctrine is widely used by various countries and is based on assessment of 
transactions according to their economic substance. Not so often used are abus de droit and fraus 
legis doctrines. These can mostly be found in civil law jurisdictions. Regarding the distinction 
between statutory and court developed anti-avoidance measures, the picture is not clear, although 
it is possible to define some common features required for their application: 
 a transaction or set of transactions that is totally or chiefly purporting at tax avoidance; 
  if given effect the object and purpose of the applicable tax law would be infringed. 
                                               
37 Para.27.7 of the Commentary on Art.1 to the OECD Model (Condensed Version), 2010. 
38 R.Russo, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning, 2007, p. 207. 
39 G.S.Cooper, The Design and Structure of General Anti-Tax Avoidance Regimes, Bulletin for International 
Taxation, January 2009, p. 26. 
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Usually, the sham and substance-over-form doctrines serve to detect the real facts with reference 
to which the relevant tax law is applied. In the case of statutory or court developed abus de droit 
and fraus legis, application of the doctrine may result in the recharacterization of facts that entail 
tax liability that would otherwise be avoided by the legal structure40. “Without exception the 
GAARs can have international effect and there is no distinction in their application depending 
on the national or international effect”41. 
Since GAARs are for those circumstances where the drafter has not foreseen what the taxpayer 
will do, G. Cooper defines the four different ways of conceptualizing tax avoidance that 
permeate the approaches commonly taken in a general rule: 
– tax avoidance is something done deliberately; 
– it usually menace a policy or purpose of the tax legislation; 
– it is a scheme or transaction that depicts certain physical characteristics; 
– is something that leads to an outcome in the form of inappropriate tax saving rather than the 
commercial result of the deal42. 
With regard to general and specific anti-avoidance rules, the question can be posed whether and 
to what extent their application can be reconciled with tax treaty obligations. Does their 
application constitute a treaty override? Does their application coincide with the good faith 
requirement according to Art.31 of the VCLT?43 
3.2. Domestic anti-avoidance provisions (specific) 
Not so long time ago the specific anti-avoidance provisions increased considerably. “Their 
features are varied and far-reaching: they impute income regardless of its realization, 
reattribute income, recharacterize income, disallow deductions, etc”.44 With reference to 
specific anti-avoidance provisions in domestic law, the two types of them can be distinguished: 
provisions that apply to all taxable persons and categories of income and in fact are called upon 
to eliminate domestic tax avoidance and those that address cross-border situations. The first type 
is covered in the present work to the extent that the operation of these measures is likely to affect 
or to be affected by double tax treaties.45 Specific anti-avoidance rules discussed below include 
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controlled foreign companies, thin capitalization, anti-debt creation, anti-dual resident, anti-
hybrid and anti-tax haven rules.46  
A plenitude of specific anti-avoidance provisions address emigration of companies and 
individuals, redemption of pension entitlements, controlled foreign companies (CFCs) residing 
in low-tax jurisdictions, payments to companies that are non-resident or resident in low-tax 
jurisdictions, etc. For a number of these rules a great deal of commonality is present, e.g. exit 
taxes, CFC regimes and thin capitalization rules. 
Other rules, however, are not broadly used by various countries, e.g. the denial of exemptions to 
non-resident companies that are owned by residents of the source country (Israel). “Apart from 
the less prevalent measures, four groups of provisions can be distinguished: provisions focused 
on situations (a) where a person ceases to be a resident of a country, (b) where income is moved 
offshore, (c) where the tax base of a country is eroded, and (d) where the character of income is 
changed”47. 
Transfer of residence 
The brightest example addressing the transfer of residence are the provisions that entail fake 
(continued) residence upon the transfer of residence abroad (deeming provisions) and exit 
taxes.48 
Base companies 
Definitely the most common rules addressing the offshore income of base companies are 
enshrined in CFC legislation. Such rules have two basic forms. “They either attribute income 
earned by a CFC to the shareholder of that entity (the ‘lookthrough’ approach) or deem the 
shareholder to have received dividends from the entity (the ‘deemed dividend’ approach)”49. The 
CFC legislation may adopt a ‘designated jurisdiction’ (low-tax countries) or ‘effective-tax-rate’ 
approach (CFC rules apply to companies that, for whatever reason, pay less than a specified 
effective tax rate). Key points to be taken into account with reference to the application of CFC 
legislation are as follows: 
 the definition of control for CFC purposes; 
 when the income or the entity fails within its scope; 
  whether any form of double tax relief is provided for the (low) tax paid overseas.50  
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Other provisions addressing offshore income are so-called switchover clauses, in which the 
exemption for foreign dividend or branch income is substituted by a credit for foreign tax if the 
income is passive and/or lowly taxed or flat denial of an exemption without a credit in the case 
of lowly taxed foreign subsidiaries51. 
Base erosion 
Obviously, the thin capitalization rules are the most widespread in this category. At the same 
time, earnings-stripping rules and rules limiting the deduction of interest payments to a 
percentage of assets take place often52. From a tax perspective, the treatment of the remuneration 
paid for the use of debt or equity is significantly distinct. Usually, interest is deductible at the 
level of the payer and subject to tax at ordinary rates in the hands of the recipient. Otherwise, 
dividends are basically non-deductible at the level of the payer and enjoy some form of relief 
from economic double taxation in the hands of the recipient. Thus, it is obvious that this dif-
ferential treatment of dividends versus interest generates multiple opportunities. Crucial aspects 
to be taken into account when analyzing thin capitalization rules are:  
 the scope of the provisions (both subjective and objective);  
 the determination of the debt to equity ratio;  
 the outcomes of the application of the provisions; 
 the availability of safeguard clauses.53 
Particular jurisdictions, e.g. Belgium, restrict the deductibility of expenses paid to non-residents 
if they are residents in countries with low or no taxation or in countries with a preferential tax 
regime. To the contrary in Israel exemptions are allowed to non-resident companies. But in case 
if at least 25 per cent are held by the residents of Israel, the aforementioned exemptions are not 
applicable. Thin capitalization rules may recharacterize disallowed interest into dividend, but for 
withholding tax purposes dividend may be recharacterised into interest as well inAustralia, for 
instance.54 
Miscellaneous 
Apart from the above-mentioned domestic anti-avoidance provisions, there is a wide variety of 
less prevalent ones. Among them there are anti-dual resident rules, anti-hybrid rules, and anti-tax 
haven, etc. Several states have rules to prevent double utilization of losses, often through dual 
resident companies. The United States has similar rules that, broadly, prevent the deducibility of 
losses in the United States when the same losses have already been deducted in another 
                                               
51 S v. Weeghel, IFA General Report, 2010, p. 23. 
52 S v. Weeghel, IFA General Report, 2010, p. 24. 
53 R.Russo, Fundamentals of International Tax Planning, 2007, pp. 221-222. 
54 S v. Weeghel, IFA General Report, 2010, p 24. 
 17
jurisdiction. More recently, some states have introduced rules to counter the use of hybrid in-
struments and hybrid entities. Specifically, in 2005 the United Kingdom has introduced a 
complex set of rules, which, inter alia, can deny relief for any expense arising as part of a 
scheme involving hybrid entities or hybrid instruments. Quite interestingly, the Denmark 
introduced rules that address hybrid entities and hybrid instruments, which may cause the Danish 
tax rules to follow the foreign characterization of entities and/or instruments in order to prevent 
tax arbitrage, and others. 
4. TREATY INTERPRETATION  
4.1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Being international agreements all treaties concluded between countries under public 
international law should be interpreted pursuant to international law principles55. Some scholars 
argue that a double tax treaty can be effective only in case of uniform interpretation and similar 
application in both contracting states. It is crucial to have criteria for interpretation that would 
function as guidelines in order to support the interpreting procedure aiming at maintenance of 
legal certainty both for tax-payers and states to assure the non-arbitrary interpretation of DDT.56 
Article 31(1) reads as follows: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
objects and purpose”57. Put it otherwise, “This rule calls for a textual, a teleological and a 
systematic interpretation”58.  
Art. 32 of the VCLT embodies the supplementary means of interpretation including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion but only to support the 
meaning that is a result of interpretation from Art. 31 if it stays ambiguous or unreasonable59. 
B. Arnold in his article heavily criticizes60 the interpretive approach taken by the states that 
consider abuses of a treaty separately from abuses of domestic law. According to Para.9.3 of the 
Commentary on Art.1 “a proper construction of tax conventions allows them to disregard 
abusive transactions, such as those entered into with the view to obtaining unintended benefits 
under the provisions of these conventions. This interpretation results from the object and purpose 
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of tax conventions as well as the obligation to interpret them in good faith”61. Arnold argues that 
in such a case the reference to Art.31 of the VCLT is not enough effective and persuasive. This 
could be used to approve any type of interpretation: literal or textual, purposive or intentional. 
Furthermore, as mentioned before in this thesis, in the case of interpreting the convention on the 
basis of its purpose to prevent tax avoidance, it could be said that preventing tax avoidance is not 
the sole or principal purpose of tax convention. Thus, Arnold comes to conclusion that using the 
interpretive approach would result in more confusion rather than clarity on the OECD 
discussions and impede reaching further consensus among the states.62  
4.2. The role of the OECD Commentary in treaty interpretation 
The OECD Model and the Commentaries do not, however, have as much weight as the wording 
of the convention itself because they are not part of the agreement.63 According to Arnold, it is 
difficult to reach consensus with regard to Commentaries status since VCLT does not mention it 
and eventually there is no equivalent to the Commentaries in treaties.64  
Some scholars consider that the OECD Commentaries put together part of the context mentioned 
in Article 31 VCLT65, others of the opinion that the OECD Model Convention and the 
Commentary thereto are ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ by reference to Article 32 
VCLT, provided that tax treaty negotiations were based of the OECD Model and its 
Commentaries66. This position can be proved by the fact that during the drafting procedure 
member states always have opportunity to submit their observations to interpretations offering 
their opinion on the matter and that the absence of such an observation can be construed as an 
expressed agreement with the Commentaries position.67  
The process of interpreting a tax treaty triggers plenty of issues worth addressing. These are: 
static vs. ambulatory interpretation of tax treaties, changes of the OECD Model and the 
Commentaries under static and ambulatory interpretation and relation between the Commentary 
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and Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. Legal certainty and pacta sunt servanda are the crucial arguments 
in favour of static interpretation meaning that later developments are irrelevant and should not be 
taken into consideration.68 In some cases, however, a more recent version of the OECD 
Commentary can be helpful in the interpretation of an older DTT because that version reflects 
practice already common in some areas. The first OECD Model and Commentary from 1963 
were not created overnight but followed existing bilateral treaty practice. Provided that a version 
of the OECD Model or the Commentary actually reflects bilateral practice, these materials can 
also be useful for the interpretation of later DTT(s).69 Thus, an ambulatory interpretation stresses 
that an interpretation based on obsolete references and assumptions is inefficient and can lead to 
unsatisfactory outcomes.70 
Alongside with the debate on the legal status of the OECD Commentary, another issue arises – 
with regard to post-treaty amendments in the Commentaries, which version of the Commentary 
should prevail? 
The approach of applying later versions has been convincingly criticized by some commentators, 
as these later versions of the Commentary have not been considered by the parliament who 
approved the DTT. Later versions of the Commentary are not ‘context’ for the purpose of 
Art.31(1) of the VCLT because only those Commentaries that are made in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty can be considered as context. They cannot be considered ‘subsequent 
agreements’ either for the purposes of Art. 31(3) of the VCLT since that would require further 
ratification. In order to be considered ‘subsequent practice’ within the meaning of Art. 31(3) 
VCLT, evidence would be required to show that the Commentary reflected actual subsequent 
practice of both contracting states; relying on the words of the OECD Commentary only would 
not suffice for this purpose.71 Finally, later changes to the Commentary cannot be considered 
‘special meaning’ within the meaning of Art. 31(4) of the VCLT since the parties could not have 
intended an interpretation that did not exist at the time the DTT was concluded.72 
It has, however, been pointed out that refusing to take later Commentaries into account can result 
in the Commentaries being frozen in time and therefore failing to adapt to changes in business or 
technology. If later Commentaries are not used, the result could be a different interpretation of 
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identical wording in treaties entered into at different times. This goes against the goal of uniform 
interpretation of DTTs.73 
The OECD attitude towards the status of the Commentaries, is expressed in Para.35 of the 
Introduction to the Commentary as follows: “[c]hanges or additions to the Commentaries are 
normally applicable to the interpretation and application of conventions concluded before their 
adoption, because they reflect the consensus of the OECD member countries as to the proper 
interpretation of existing provisions and their application to specific situations” and in Para.36: 
“Many amendments are intended to simply clarify, not change, the meaning of the Articles or the 
Commentaries…”.74  
Though, scholars agree that even the revised Commentary falls within the scope of 
‘supplementary means of interpretation’ mentioned in Art.32 VCLT, while the Commentary at 
the time of entering into the agreement can set up ‘the context’ according to Art. 31. It should be 
noticed that the Commentary itself has a great authority on account of the OECD’s outstanding 
expertise and solid support of the member states75.  
4.3. Summary 
Thus, the general rules of interpretation are presented in Art.31, 32 VCLT. Art.31 embodies the 
main rule to interpret in a good faith and according to the purpose of the treaty, whilst Art.32 
describes the supplementary means of interpretation that is weaker rather than the main rule 
expressed in Art.31. 
Two principal methods of interpretation can be followed to determine how OECD Model and 
Commentaries thereto refer to the VCLT. 
Under the static interpretation the OECD Model and Commentaries can be considered to form 
the context referred in Art.31 and therefore have crucial value in case if some convention 
provision need to be clarified. At the same time the ambulatory means of interpretation reflects 
both political and economical changes that take place after the treaty was signed. 
Some scholars argue that Commentaries refer to the supplementary means of interpretation. 
However, others cast doubts whether the revised Commentaries can depict the intentions of the 
parties at the moment when the agreement was reached and more importantly later 
Commentaries were not ratified by the parliaments of the contracting states. Such reasoning is 
extremely legitimate and persuading but not less important is the fact that the vast variety of tax 
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conventions was signed several decades ago and the economic situation has changed radically 
since then. 
Although the OECD Model Convention and Commentaries thereto have a crucial value for the 
double tax conventions interpretation and are broadly used by non OECD member states, they 
don’t have unfortunately legally binding authority. 
5. WHAT SHOULD PREVAIL IN CASE OF CONFLICT: TAX TREATY OR GAAR? 
Reporters from 44 countries submitted their contributions to the IFA regarding consistency 
between GAAR and tax treaties during the 2010 Rome Congress. As stated in the General Report 
the vast majority of branch reports countries do admit that the GAARs can be reconciled with 
their treaty obligations that is fully in line with the 2003 Revisions to the OECD Commentary. 
As indicated previously, the Commentary says that countries usually follow two distinct 
approaches distinguished in Para.9.2 and 9.3. The factual one, when the domestic anti-avoidance 
rules recharacterize the facts that give rise to a tax liability. The abuse of the treaty means the 
abuse of domestic provisions either. In such a situation the treaty is applied after the so-called 
recharacterization. The second approach has got the title of interpretative one due to the vast 
academic discussion around this controversial issue or simply because it relies on the 
interpretation of DTT. The underlying category is that an abuse of the treaty does not coincides 
with an abuse of domestic rules, that results in interpretation of the treaty itself in order to 
disregard the abusive transaction. Interestingly, only a few states clearly expressed in their 
branch reports which approach is followed by the present state. However, some reports, e.g. New 
Zealand, do mention that their countries stick to the factual approach and, consequently, that the 
determination of the facts under domestic law is then followed for tax treaty purposes76. To make 
the question sharp, namely, whether treaty prevails or domestic GAAR?  
C. Elliffe considers that the very underpinning in differentiation between the factual and 
interpretative approaches is the way in which domestic GAAR operate when applied to an 
abusive transaction. Apparently, the type of choosing between these two approaches can be 
determined if answered on “How do GAAR operate after being invoked?” Where the anti-
avoidance rules void the actual legal transactions and recharacterise it on the spot, then obviously 
the country will apply a factual approach. If, however, a country applies canons of statutory 
interpretation, meaning that the relevant tax provisions cannot, in case of abuse, be interpreted at 
face value, then an interpretative approach to the abuse of treaties at stake should be applied.  
Thus, the link between the factual and the interpretative approaches depends on the GAAR’s 
effect on the abuse of the treaty. In the first case a GAAR voids the existing transaction and 
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reconstructs a new non-abusive outcome (factual), and in the other case it simply disregards the 
abusive transaction (interpretative)77.  
It is worth mentioning that an approach taken by the country tells very little about the source of 
law that will be the primary source to apply in the case of any conflict. It is more concentrated on 
the effect of anti-avoidance rules’ application but not the supremacy of law. As Elliffe stresses in 
his article it is crucial to decide whether treaty overrides the domestic law or the other way 
round. What is more important in such a situation, to protect the tax base or stick at the certainty 
of law?78  
Conditionally, the branches states’ reports assume that three general categories of approaches 
exist (throughout world-wide diversity of GAARs): 
5.1. Countries where the GAAR clearly overrides the Treaty 
As Richard Vann summarizes the position of Australia in its Branch Report, since “Australia has 
many deviations from the OECD model in its treaties that guidance is often not available or very 
helpful. In such cases the courts are mainly guided by the text of the treaty (being the outcome of 
detailed negotiations) and less influenced by broad generalities such as the avoidance of double 
taxation”. In respect to priority of tax conventions or anti-abuse rules “[t]reaties override the 
rest of domestic income tax legislation except the general anti-avoidance rule”79. 
Canadian taxpayers are not entitled to any rights before the treaties are implemented in statutes. 
According to the general rule the treaty overrides any conflicting national provision except for 
ITCIA. The Canadian government clearly proclaimed that the GAAR applies to any benefit 
provided by a treaty80. 
The USA reporters inform that domestic anti-abuse rules are equally applied to questions 
involving the availability of tax treaty benefits as well as to other tax questions. The American 
courts consider that domestic anti-avoidance rules are consistent with tax treaties81. 
5.2. Countries where the Treaty overrides the GAAR 
Being a vocal advocate of strict hierarchy of sources of law set under art.94 of the Dutch 
Constitution, the Netherlands do not allow the supremacy of anti-abuse legislation over the tax 
conventions in case of conflict “Since tax treaty provisions are binding upon everyone, they 
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prevail over national law”82. Despite the fact that fraus legis doctrine was developed for a long 
time in the Netherlands, its application along with tax conventions casts doubt on the treaty 
partners shared views and justified expectations as well as threatens the predominant purpose of 
tax conventions to prevent double taxation83. At least, such position is totally consistent with the 
declared observation under Para.27.7 of the Commentaries. 
After careful examination of the Dutch and Portuguese Reports one may find their standpoints 
analogous with each other. Under the Portuguese constitutional system international rules 
binding the Portuguese state prevail over domestic provisions, regardless of the time when such 
rules had been enacted. This means that DAAR can not be applied if this result in the tax treaty 
provisions being overridden. “In spite of the OECD MC Commentary on article 1, the reporters 
believe that DAARs may be used to determine the tax liability of a specific taxpayer, but not to 
change the fact pattern in a way that first would jeopardize the agreement signed between two 
contracting states and, secondly, would undermine the confidence and certainty of taxpayers' 
legitimate expectations that are protected by the Portuguese Constitution.”84 
5.3. Countries where the GAAR will override the Treaty unless there is a clear conflict, in 
which case the Treaty prevails 
It is comparatively easy to accept two first categories of approaches due to their explicit position 
at issue what prevails in substance the treaty provisions or GAAR. In various countries the 
attitude on the matter is not that clear due to attempts to reconcile these competing sources of 
law. As B. Arnold summarized in his article “[i]n most countries, generally speaking, tax 
treaties prevail over domestic tax laws in the event of a conflict”85. New Zealand is a very bright 
example of such a country. It has elaborated a kind of hybrid approach aiming to reconcile the 
international public law with the domestic GAARs. The academics analyze the New Zealand 
legislation and refer to the Income Tax Act that admits precedence of both tax avoidance 
arrangements and double tax arrangements with regard to the rest of legislation, but without any 
primacy as against each other86. Therefore, the scholars’ standpoints have split and J. Prebble 
takes the view that the GAAR application is totally unfettered. Otherwise, C. Elliffe does 
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consider that unless the treaty is itself being abused, the explicit definition in the treaty and the 
treaty itself should prevail over the GAAR. Anyway, both authors agree that under the factual 
approach, the GAAR will recharacterize the transaction that way so there will be no conflict 
between tax treaty and the GAAR87. The same position is depicted in the New Zealand Branch 
Report. “However, in circumstances where there is conflict between the treaty and domestic law, 
the treaty will prevail, unless the transaction is an abusive one, in which case the test under the 
commentary will be whether “a main purpose” is to obtain a favorable tax position that is 
contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions”88. 
5.4. Abuse of the tax treaty itself: domestic law principles or interpretation of the treaties? 
Interpretation of the DTT itself is not the application of domestic anti-abuse rules. Usually 
treaties are construed based on the domestic interpretation methods and such domestic 
interpretation methods often are in a form of anti-abuse legislations. Hence, abuse of the tax 
treaty itself approach is basically the application of a domestic law. 
Interestingly, it could be construed from the General IFA Report that the consolidated approach 
in respect to interpretation of tax convention being abused itself does not exist. In slight 
deviation from Paras.9.2 and 9.3 of the Commentary the branch reporters were asked to 
comment on their country’s approach to abuse of a tax treaty itself: would it be addressed under 
domestic law principles or by means of interpretation of tax convention? Whilst some countries, 
like Ukraine89, have no precedent on the matter and therefore are not able to provide any 
guidance, other states’ replies very significantly. Traditionally, some states hold an opinion that 
the abuse of the treaty must be addressed through interpretation of the treaty itself referring to 
Art.31 of the VCLT, New Zealand, for instance. But considerable number of states clearly 
expressed that such an abuse is addressed by applying domestic anti-abuse principles90. France 
indicated that “The abuse of a tax treaty is legally granted in the statutory general anti-
avoidance abus de droit. Abuse of tax treaties may be sanctioned only based on the statute and 
not on the DDT itself”. “Unless an abus de droit is characterized under domestic law, there can 
be no situation of abuse of a tax treaty”91. The South Africa explicitly states that “[o]nce a 
treaty is enacted it has the same standing as other domestic law provisions”. “[p]rovisions of the 
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treaty will rank equally with South African domestic statutory provisions…” “Consequently, 
they need to be interpreted in terms of the normal rules”92. 
While analyzing these three approaches that states undertake with regard to relationship between 
the GAAR and tax treaties, governments, judges or even judicial systems give precedence to one 
guiding principle above another. Some countries consider that having certainty in dealing with 
cross-boarder activities is of great importance both for tax payers and revenue authorities. Others 
stick to opinion that the main purpose of tax convention is to prevent double taxation along with 
not to abuse the domestic tax base. Netherlands, for instance, being the votary of the primacy of 
the treaty does not however totally exclude fraus legis doctrine application. Hence, there can be 
inconsistency of treatment of a tax payer due to the diverse preference of one principle over 
another by different states. 
Such an inconsistent approach of various states with regard to cross-boarder transactions can be 
illustrated by the following example93. 
This ‘definitional’ situation was discussed by the general reporter Stef van Weeghel, as well as 
by C. Elliffe, J. Prebble in their article “General Anti-Avoidance Rules and Double Tax 
Arrangements”. A Dutch shareholder receives capital gains by selling shares in both a US and a 
New Zealand company to another company that it owns. The purpose of this transaction is to 
obtain more favorable tax treatment in the capacity of capital gains rather than receiving 
dividend distributions. Under domestic anti-abuse rules both the US and New Zealand tax 
authorities may recharacterise this transaction as a dividend disregarding the legal form of the 
sale transaction and further such domestic recharacterisation would then be applied for tax treaty 
purposes. From the New Zealand perspective it is considered as the factual approach that would 
be applied. From the United States perspective it is considered as the interpretive approach that 
was used.  
As for the Netherlands, the capital gain should be recharacterised into a dividend under the fraus 
legis doctrine. But contrary to the US and New Zealand treatment, such a recharacterisation 
under the Dutch legislation for tax treaty purposes conflicts with their tax treaty obligations. So 
the Dutch treatment would be in line with its tax treaty provisions to regard the sale as a capital 
gain. 
 “A capital gain derived by a resident of the United States in respect of shares in the company 
resident in the Netherlands could thus be regarded as a dividend (a) for US domestic law 
purposes, (b) for the Netherlands-USA tax treaty in the interpretation by the United States, and 
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(c) for Dutch domestic law purposes (and prior law), but as a capital gain for the Netherlands-
USA tax treaty in the interpretation by the Netherlands.”94 
In case of discrepancies of treaty outcomes a taxpayer should refer to the mutual agreement 
procedures under the relevant article. 
Such example, presented in the IFA General report according to C.Elliffe brightly illustrates how 
the approaches of three countries regarding dividend stripping do function in practice. Each 
country has its own arguments in favour of either prevalence of certainty approach or prevalence 
of abuse approach. Certainty and pacta sunt servanda, the approach preferred by the Netherlands 
reflects the basic principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda. It not only highlights the 
inviolable nature of double tax treaties but also refrains the treaty partners from infringement of 
their obligations under the convention. Tax treaties override the domestic legislation and in case 
of uniform application by both states reduce possibilities of double taxation (that historically 
used to be the core purpose of double tax conventions). Two aspects are combined by pacta sunt 
servanda: the certainty itself, when a taxpayer can rely on the outcome prescribed by a treaty; 
and the aspect of consistency – the consistent application by both states while dealing with cross-
boarder transaction95. 
The approach taken by the US and New Zealand in the aforementioned example, pursue the 
states’ sovereign taxing rights in abusive situations. This arguably can result in the situation that 
a taxpayer will not receive the outcome prescribed by the treaty under its strict interpretation. 
The previous statement is clearly critical to its meaning since as explained in other sections of 
this thesis the treaties should be interpreted in accordance with VCLT that could be with 
reference to OECD Commentaries. The OECD Commentary in its turn starting from 2003 
approved the prevention of tax avoidance as one of the treaty’s direct purposes and held the view 
that countries should be generally able to apply their GAARs to the treaties that they concluded 
(even without directly specifying this in the treaty itself). In a nutshell, governments will not 
allow the artificial use of the treaty to erode their tax base96. 
5.5. Summary 
The OECD Commentary position does not suggest the comprehensive classification of the 
relationship that in practice exists between anti-avoidance legislation and double tax conventions 
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in various countries. The author totally supports the C. Elliffe standpoint that the best criteria to 
follow is indentifying which overrules which. 
In general countries could be grouped in three categories. Those that consider avoidance as 
extremely serious problem have clearly proclaimed that GAARs apply to abusive transactions 
involving the double tax treaties and overrule treaties. This approach is based on the OECD 
Commentary position. The other approach stands for the application of the treaty that overrides 
domestic legislation. Certainty is of crucial value for such countries. In such a situation to solve a 
problem of abuse requires renegotiation of treaties.  
The third category of countries has hybrid features. Basically the domestic GAAR operate on 
cross-border transactions and override the treaty, but in case of a conflict between tax treaty and 
GAARs, the treaty will prevail and override the domestic anti-abusive rules. 
In attempt to reconcile two competing principles towards treaty obligations to be observed while 
ensuring that treaties are not abused it is not easy to determine the most appropriate approach. 
The hybrid approach may be more common and therefore accepted by various countries because 
it ensures clear treaty outcomes along with protection against treaty abuse. One more argument 
in favour of this approach is difference in relationship between domestic law and the GAAR, and 
treaties and the GAAR undertaken by many states97. 
6. CASE LAW: RUSSIA 
6.1. Examination of cases 
Case A56-19578/2006 of 9 April 2007 
Interregional Tax Inspectorate No. 6 of Leningrad region (hereinafter, the tax authority) has 
recharacterized the interest paid by a Swedwood Tikhvin LLC (hereinafter, the taxpayer), a 
Russian subsidiary to its parent company resident in the Netherlands. Under Russian thin 
capitalization rules, the payment could not be qualified as a deduction since the net assets of the 
taxpayer were negative during time at issue. As a result, the interest that was considered by a 
taxpayer as a deductable expense was recharacterized into dividend and tax authorities charged 
additional withholding tax at source with regard to such payments. 
The Court in its decision relies on Art.7 of the Russia’s Tax Code that clearly states as follows: 
“If the international agreement of the Russian Federation, including provisions, regarding 
taxation and fees, set rules and provisions contrary to the present Code and regulatory legal acts 
on taxes and (or) fees, adopted thereto, the rules and provisions of such international 
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agreements of Russian Federation shall be applied then”98. This position is also approved in 
Para.12 of the Highest Arbitration Court’s Information Note #58 of 18.01.2001 and Para.10 
Information Note of the Presidium of the Highest Arbitration Court of 25.12.1996.  
Art. 11 and 25 of the Netherlands-Russia Income and Capital Tax Treaty of 16.12.1996 
(hereinafter, the DTT) were carefully analyzed by the court. Based on deduction non-
discrimination clause and ownership non-discrimination clause enshrined accordingly into 
Art.25(3) and 25(4) of DTT the taxpayer claimed that domestic thin cap rules were not 
compatible due to the fact that the thin cap rules do not apply to interest on loans between 
resident companies. Also, the court noted that according to Art.IV and VII of the Protocol to 
DTT that provides for the definitions of both interests and dividends accordingly, and the tax 
authorities erroneously, contrary to the definitions of terms indicated in the DTT recharacterized 
the interest into dividends99. 
Art.15(4) of the Constitution of Russia applied jointly with Art.7 of the Tax Code of RF 
constitutes the precedence of international agreements over domestic legislation100. 
The Federal Arbitration Court of the North-West Region has confirmed the decisions taken by 
the first level court and the appellate court in favour of the taxpayer. Since with regard to 
expenses on interest under the loans, the DTT constitutes other rules than provided by other 
regulatory legislation of RF, and in substance such expenses on interest are not restricted by the 
Convention, and there are no any reservations on application of national legislation herein the 
courts of previous instances soundly approved the precedence of DTT over domestic legislation 
and in substance applied Art.11(2) of the DTT101.  
Case A26-6967/2008 of 23 September 2009 
A Russian resident AEK LLC (hereinafter, the taxpayer) paid interest on a loan to its parent 
Karkhatek JSC in Finland. The Russian tax authorities took the position that the domestic thin-
capitalization rules prescribed by Art.269(2) of the Tax Code allowed them to re-characterize the 
interest payments into dividends, if a debt-equity ratio between the foreign lender and the 
Russian interest payer exceeds 3:1 and as a result to charge additionally tax at source. 
As in previous case, the Court carefully examined the definitions of terms provided in Art.10 and 
11 in the Finland-Russia Income Tax Treaty and ‘Ownership non-discrimination clause’ under 
Art. 23(4). According to Art.312 of the Tax Code the foreign resident shall not be charged tax at 
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source in case if he acts according to provisions of the effective DTT and has provided the tax 
residence certificate from its Residence country102.  
Since the Finnish company provided for all documentation required under Art.312 of the Tax 
Code, and based on the Art. 11(2) applied in conjunction with Art.23(4) of DDT, the Federal 
Arbitration Court of North-West Region came to conclusion that DTT has a precedence over thin 
cap rules in order to guarantee the non-discriminatory treatment of Russian companies owned by 
Finnish ones103. 
Case KA40/9453-09-2 of 23 September 2009 is very similar to the previous case and therefore 
is not presented in a detail. The non-discrimination clause in Para.24(4) of the Cyprus-Russia 
Income and Capital Tax Treaty also precludes the application of domestic thin cap rules because 
DTT has a primary powers104.  
Case 8654/11 of 15 November 2011  
The taxpayer, “Ugolnaya kompania “Severniy Kuzbass” JSC (hereinafter, the taxpayer), was 
company resident in Russia (previously, a subsidiary to a Cypriot parent). In 2007, the taxpayer 
borrowed money from another Russian company, “Severstal Resurs”, under the loan agreement. 
Hereafter, the lender yielded the right of claim to Mittal Steel Holding AG, registered in 
Switzerland, and subsequently this right of claim was also transferred to ArcelorMittal Finanse 
(Luxemburg). The Steel Holding AG was also the shareholder of more than 20% of shares in 
“Severstal Resurs”. The taxpayer had also loans from other affiliated companies. 
According to Art.269(2) of the Tax Code of the RF, the thin capitalization rules (debt-equity 3:1) 
apply, if a non-resident company which directly or indirectly holds or controls more than 20% of 
a Russian company’s share capital, or if a Russian company has a debt to another Russian 
company which is an affiliate of a non-resident company. The thin capitalization rules do not 
apply if a Russian company is wholly owned by other Russian entities or individuals105. Taking 
into account the fact, that loans were provided by affiliated companies, the tax authorities argued 
that thin cap rules should be applied with regard to the interests paid under the loan agreements 
of a shareholder and that such interest payments should not be included in a taxpayer’s expenses. 
During the case examination the Supreme Arbitration Court took into consideration the 
following facts: 
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– significant amounts of the loans were granted without guarantees or pledges while the 
taxpayer’s net assets were negative (this argument casts doubts that the loans were made 
between unrelated parties); 
– when the taxpayer’s shares were transferred from the Cyprus to the Swiss holding, the debt 
was transferred simultaneously; 
– interest on the loan was accrued but was not paid for significant periods of the loans’ terms. 
The Russia’s Supreme Arbitration Court held that previous decisions (in the first and appellate 
instances) were made erroneously due to reference to Art.24 (4) of DTTs with Switzerland and 
Cyprus accordingly that states as follows: “Enterprises of a Contracting State, the capital of 
which is wholly or partly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more residents of 
the other Contracting State, shall not be subjected in the first-mentioned State to any taxation or 
any requirement connected therewith which is other or more burdensome than the taxation and 
connected requirements to which other similar enterprises of the first-mentioned State are or 
may be subjected”. 106 The Court states that aforementioned Art.24(4) was construed too broadly 
that in substance denied application of the domestic thin cap rules under Art.269(2) of the Tax 
Code. 
Instead, the Court made a link between the affiliated persons in question under Art.269(2) and 
transfer pricing rules provided under Art.9 of OECD Model and arm’s length principle thereto. 
The Court directly refers in its decision to Para1.3(b) of Commentaries on Art.9 to the OECD 
Model which explicitly states that “[t]he article is relevant not only in determining whether the 
rate of interest provided for in a loan contract is an arm’s length rate, but also whether a prima 
facie loan can be regarded as a loan or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in 
particular a contribution to equity capital”107. 
Thus, the Court came to conclusion that Art.9 calls upon for application of national legislation to 
deny benefits enshrined in Art.24(4) especially in such a situation when a taxpayer has not 
liquidated its debt before non-residents lenders.  
The Supreme Arbitration Court held in favour of the tax authorities. The taxpayer was precluded 
from including the interest payments into its deductable expenses. The Court observed that in 
general tax treaties do not preclude the application of domestic anti-avoidance rules, in 
particular, in respect of the re-characterization of loan into equity contributions. Ultimately, 
Supreme Arbitration Court concluded that the anti-avoidance provisions in Russian domestic law 
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in respect of thin capitalization rules are neither discriminatory nor in conflict with Russia’s 
obligations under its tax treaties108. 
A40-1164/11-99-7 of 27 February 2012 
Under Art.269(2) of the Tax Code, the thin capitalization rules apply in cases where a Russian 
company has an outstanding debt to a foreign company which possesses directly or indirectly 
more than 20% of its shareholder capital109. Naryanmarneftegas LLC (hereinafter as the taxpayer 
“NMNG”) was financed by its sisters companies - members of the same international group of 
companies. Interestingly, the one of the lenders Philips Petroleum International Investment 
Company (“PPIIC”) did not own any shares in taxpayers’ share capital, either directly or 
indirectly. In 2004 the USA Company ConocoPhillips established a joint venture with the 
Russian company, Lukoil, in order to obtain a 30% stake in "NMNG" through indirect 
participation and also to acquire some entitlements to gas-oil activities in Russia. The US 
Company ConocoPhillips indirectly owns 30% in the share capital of the taxpayer ("NMNG"). 
At the same time, the taxpayer "NMNG" has a debt exceeding 3:1 debt/equity ratio before 
“PPIIC” company that is totally owned by the US ConocoPhillips Company.  
The courts of previous instances ascertained the fact that the total debt of a taxpayer before the 
whole international group exceeded more than 3 times the debt/equity ratio prescribed by 
Art.269. Besides, such settlements were not objected by the taxpayer. There were no any loan 
agreements between the taxpayer and the US Company ConocoPhillips. In the taxpayers’ 
opinion the thin cap rules can be applied only in case if a lender itself possesses directly or 
indirectly more than 20 % in its share capital. Therefore, there are no any features of the 
controlled debt and in observation of the taxpayer Art.269(2) can not be applicable in this 
situation. The strongest arguments of a taxpayer “NMNG” among others were as follows: 
 PPIIC was not the shareholder of NMNG and owned NMNG neither directly nor 
indirectly. 
 NMNG did not conclude any loan agreements with ConocoPhillips. 
 PPIIC is a resident of the United States; therefore the treaty applies. 
 The treaty does not provide a basis for re-characterization of interest payments into 
dividends. 
 Under Art.807 of the Civil Code of the RF, a relationship in a loan agreement only exists 
between lender and borrower. 
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After the careful consideration of the framework agreements between the Company 
ConocoPhillips and Russian Company Lukoil, loan agreements and the financial statements of 
all companies involved in this case, the Federal Arbitration Court of Moscow Region 
(hereinafter, the Court) came to conclusion that in substance it was the US Company 
ConocoPhillips who financed the taxpayer by using its daughter company PPIIC as a technical 
vehicle. Following an analysis of the agreement, Lukoil and ConocoPhillips agreed that funding 
of the joint venture was performed through debt financing instead of capital financing.  
The financing was performed by Lukoil and ConocoPhillips on a pro rata basis according to their 
stakes in the taxpayer NMNG share capital through indirect participation. Thus, it held in favour 
of the tax authorities. The Court observed that this financing scheme used by an integrated group 
of companies should be considered altogether since it is embodied by the sole purpose and the 
common obligation aiming at financing the taxpayer “NMNG”110.  
6.2. Conclusion 
The Russian domestic legislation does not contain the statutory GAAR. Instead it has specific 
rules that aim at preventing certain types of abuse, transfer pricing, thin capitalization and the 
limitation on participation exemption among others. ‘Unjustified tax benefit’ doctrine is 
currently being developed by national courts111. 
Based on the careful examination of cases presented in this thesis, as well as analysis of the 
domestic Russian legislation the following outcomes can be reached with regard to relationship 
between the domestic anti-avoidance provisions and tax treaties: 
 According to Art.15(4) of the Constitution of the RF in conjunction with Art. 7 of the 
Tax Code, the tax treaties shall take precedence over national legislation in case of 
conflict between domestic provisions and those in tax treaties. 
 Russia signed the VCLT in 1969, which became effective for Russia as of 29th of May 
1986 that constitutes the international public law principle pacta sunt servanda to be 
observed by the RF under its treaty obligations. 
 The RF is not a member of the OECD, and therefore Commentaries to the OECD Model 
have no any binding effect for Russia while interpreting tax treaties by national courts. 
The first three cases obviously highlight the incompatibility of Russian thin cap rules with the 
applicable provisions of DTTs. The courts interpret the term interest autonomously under tax 
treaties and deny the recharacterization of interest into dividend under domestic tax law. Russia 
clearly follows the approach when the tax treaty overrides domestic anti-avoidance rules. To 
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protect its tax base in such a situation Russia initiated amendments to the effective conventions 
by signing the Protocol thereto. The Cyprus-Russia Protocol to the 1998 Treaty is a bright 
exemple of this effort with regard to interest-dividend matter that may arise in case of 
reclassification. “However, the term "interest" shall not include for the purpose of this Article 
penalty charges for late payment or interest regarded as dividends under paragraph 3 of Article 
10”112. Thus, Art.10(3) of the Cyprus-Russia Tax Treaty (as amended through 2010) gives the 
new defitition of dividend that also encompases “income even paid in the form of interest”113 
that serves as a great evidence of Rissia’s will to reconcile its DTTs with domestic anti-abuse 
rules. 
But the last two cases envisaged in this thesis explicitly demonstrate the harsh changes in the 
chosen trend. The domestic thin cap rules provided under Art.269 of the Tax Code of the RF 
were applied to deny benefits provided by the range of Russian DTTs with the USA, Switzerland 
and Cyprus as well. Interestingly, the aforementioned changes enacted by Cyprus-Russia 
Protocol has entered into force as of 2nd of April 2012, but last two decisions were held by courts 
before that date, that is a heavy evidence of treaty’s misinterpretation. The taxpayers arguments 
based on non-discrimination clauses were disregarded then. The fresh approach was explained 
with a glance to the following aspects: 
 The DTT’s provisions on dividends and interests were interpreted in such a way that 
domestic thin cap rules were not considered discriminatory as against rules provided by 
conventions. 
 Domestic thin cap rules are considered as specific provisions that are in line with the 
purpose of DTTs to prevent tax avoidance. 
 Art.31 of the VCLT allows reference to supplementary means of interpretation that in 
substance means to the OECD Model and Commentaries thereto. 
 Even though the RF is not a member of the OECD, but the official interpretation of DTTs 
enshrined in Commentaries to the OECD Model takes the obligatory character for Russia 
aiming to reach reciprocity in interpretation and application of a DTT entered with the 
OECD member state114. 
Thus, the position of the Russian courts taken in the last decisions follows the official OECD 
position with regard to possibility of recharacterization of interest into dividend and results in the 
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interpretation of non-discrimination clause as general rule compared to the specific thin cap rule 
enshrined in the Tax Code of the RF. 
The author, however, considers last precedents as flagrantly violating both the international 
public law (pacta sunt servanda) and domestic Constitutional legal order in Russia. In the 
author’s opinion, in a general course of things, the RF should have firmly stick to approach when 
the treaty overrides GAAR (due to pacta sunt servanda principle and constitutionally settled 
precedence of the ratified conventions over national legislation), but recent precedents give 
evidence to the contrary. The national courts have chosen to rest upon Commentaries to the 
OECD Model despite the fact that the RF is not an OECD member state and its obligations under 
conventions. Thereby, even though under the general rule in Russia treaties prevail over national 
legislation, in case of a conflict between a DTT and domestic anti-avoidance rules, the Russian 
courts have applied the domestic anti-abuse legislation to deny tax treaty benefits. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has investigated a very controversial and complicated question: whether domestic 
anti-abuse legislation applies to deny tax treaty benefits. The four main themes were analyzed 
and compared in order to clearly understand the assigned task: the OECD position on the matter, 
the methods of interpretation under the VCLT, the approaches undertaken by various countries 
based on their reports 2010, and ultimately the case law of the RF to contribute in issue from the 
national perspective. While it is still difficult to detect precisely the commonality and differences 
of approach to tax treaties and anti-abuse rules, a number of outcomes can be drawn from the 
materials analyzed.  
First, it can be construed that many states make an attempt to reconcile their anti-avoidance 
legislation with tax treaty obligations. The OECD position clarified due to changes in the 
Commentary made in 2003 is supported by great number of states that in substance means that 
domestic anti-avoidance rules are consistent with double tax conventions; therefore states may 
use them in order to determine facts that give rise to a tax liability with further recharacterization 
of abusing transactions.  
Second, after the careful examination of the General Report 2010 and Reports of some states, the 
author comes to conclusion that despite the OECD position is very useful and aims to providing 
certainty on the matter, it is not fully reflective of the practical situation from the states national 
perspective. Among three approaches considered in this paper, the hybrid one seems the most 
effective and compromise. It seeks to reconcile both fulfillment of tax treaty obligations with 
counteracting abusive transactions. 
Third, abuse of the treaty itself section of this thesis shows that there is no essential outcome for 
the question raised herein whether states interpret the treaty based on the domestic law principles 
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or  pure interpretation of the treaty. Whichever method of interpretation is chosen by a certain 
state, ultimately it will be funneled to the underlying principal matter, whether the present state 
appreciates the pacta sunt servanda (the certainty at stake) or protection of its tax base the most.  
Based on the Russian case law study, it is worth mentioning that in a perfect world, a taxpayer 
should be able to rely on the provisions of the double tax treaty that are certain and consistent. 
While deciding in complicated cases the courts should take into consideration not only the 
official position of the OECD, but also the domestic Constitutional legal order in the country, 
and the transaction itself that is supposed to be abusive. When domestic law overrides a clear 
outcome granted by the provisions of the treaty it flagrantly violates the usefulness and even 
fundamental integrity of the treaty. 
The last but not least argument to be told by this thesis, is that the question posed whether 
domestic anti-abuse legislation applies to deny tax treaty benefits can be answered differently 
depending on the country chosen. Among those, considered in substance, it definitely can from 
the Russian perspective, but for the Netherlands, for instance, in spite of well-developed fraus 
legis doctrine, the question will meet the negative reply. 
In the author’s opinion, it is impossible to reach certainty in this question due to significant 
diversity of states legal systems, tax avoidance schemes and anti-avoidance rules. Neither strict 
definition of tax avoidance nor of anti-abuse rules can be formulated because otherwise plenty of 
sophisticated counter schemes will be elaborated by tax practitioners aiming to illegally receive 
benefits granted by double tax treaties.  
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